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Epilogue
Islamization of Europe, or Europeanization of Islam?
What do thirteen centuries of Islam in Europe tell us? Does the story of this inter-
action consist of a series of episodes and events that we have conveniently thrown
together under the title ‘Islam in Europe’? Or is it justified to speak of a single ex-
perience or narrative that continues through the centuries? And if so, how can we
characterize this experience? We have seen in the previous chapters that the Euro-
pean interaction with physical as well as virtual Islam has been very diverse. Mus-
lims have been enemies and allies, foreigners and compatriots, Us and Them. Their
civilization has been feared as aggressive and expansionist, but also praised for its
religious tolerance and its culture that has produced great and innovative artists,
scientists and intellectuals to which Europe is indebted. On the other hand, Europe
has consistently upheld the picture of the Muslim Other that embodied everything
that the European was not. Still, some patterns do emerge, and here the distinction
between physical and virtual Islam is helpful.
Historical Patterns
With regard to physical Islam, there are few, if any, patterns to be discerned in
the European interactions with Islam until the late nineteenth century. Both sides
have alternated in conquering each other’s territories and, in consequence, created
societies of religiously mixed populations. Both sides have for centuries more or less
continuously been active in raiding and enslaving each other’s populations. The
same mutuality applies to the exchange of diplomatic missions. The only forms
of interaction in which there was little initiative on the Muslim side were trade,
adventurous exploration and the establishment of resident embassies or commercial
outposts – throughout the centuries of interaction, these domains were dominated
by the Europeans.
In all these interactions one cannot speak of twounified blocks facing each other;
both the Muslim and Christian sides were fractured by internal differences and
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strife, and common interests often called for military alliances and commercial
treaties across the religious divide. On the other hand, both sides always upheld a
self-image that strongly identified with religion – if not in the sense of commonly
held religious beliefs, then at least as a shared culture. Religion as an identitymarker
was a source of many frictions within the Christian and Muslim communities, but
also served as a rallying pointwhen confrontedwith the other community. Let us ex-
amine thismechanism of diversity-in-unity by examining two issues: conquest and
coexistence.
Thirteen centuries of belligerent interaction between Islam and Europe is not one of
perpetual Muslim aggression vis-à-vis Europe, “the great jihad par excellence”.1 Both
the Islamic Arab and Christian Europeanworlds were driven by intermitted periods
of hunger for conquest, and it was geographical proximity thatmade the other a tar-
get, not religious fervour. Religion did play a role, however, as the additional driving
force that vindicated war. It is presumptuous and even a form of European self-
victimization to assume that Muslims, whether Moors in the eighth century or Ot-
tomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, saw Europe as theirmain target.
They did not. The ArabMuslim conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries were
targeting North Africa (westward) and Western Asia (eastward), while Spain was a
mere extension ofNorthAfrica. And theOttomans did indeed engage in regularmil-
itary campaigns in Eastern Europe, but also did so towards Persia; the European do-
mains made up only a part – albeit an economically and culturally important part –
of their vast empire that stretched fromTunisia to Iraq and fromYemen toHungary.
Even if the conquests in Europe were sideshows in Arab and Ottoman large-
scale military operations, let us be clear on the fact that Europe was part of these
conquests and consequently these wars are part of European history. But is it then
justified to speak of the Crusades, the Reconquista, or the BalkanWars as acts of Eu-
ropean self-defence against Muslim aggression, as some authoritative figures tell
us? Pope Urban II wanted his audience to believe so when he made his call for the
First Crusade: his argument was that Jerusalem had to be re-taken. However, that
call was made more than four centuries after the city had been taken by the Arab-
Muslim armies. Moreover, we have seen that the recruitment for the crusade was
successful for reasons that were more of an internal European nature than of for-
eign belligerency. In a similar vein, the historian Bernard Lewis claims that Euro-
peans, by fighting in Spain against the Moors and rising in the Balkans against the
Turk, were “restoring homelands to Christendom.”2 This is an odd remark from
a historian. In the case of Spain, for instance, the Catholic claim of Reconquista
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may have been a justifiable emotion for the Catholic Spaniards of that time, but
in the light of Spain’s history of seven centuries of Roman rule, followed by two
centuries of Visigoth Christian rule, and then eight centuries of Moorish Muslim
rule, the claim that Spain was originally a Christian homeland is spurious. And in
the case of the Ottoman Empire we have seen that many of the revolts were not
people’s uprisings against the yoke of the Ottoman, but often motivated by other
factors.
Lewis takes the argument of European defence against Muslim aggression fur-
ther when stating that the “complex process of European expansion and empire”
has its “roots in the clash between Islam and Christendom”: in his view, European
expansionism is a result of the “long and bitter struggle of the conquered peoples
of Europe, in east and west, to restore their homelands to Christendom and expel
the Muslim peoples who had invaded and subjugated them.”3 In this European re-
conquest it was “hardly to be expected” that the vanquished Muslims would be
merely left at the borders, and so “the victorious liberators, having reconquered their
own home territories, pursued their former masters whence they had come”. These
sweeping statements are simply untrue. The Europeans who engaged in imperialist
ventures in Muslim lands in Asia and Africa were not the Europeans who had been
former subjects of Muslim rule: of these formerMuslim subjects, the Spaniards and
Portuguese were mainly active across the Atlantic, and the Balkan peoples have not
engaged in any imperialist adventures at all. On the contrary, it was the European
peoples that had not been affected by Moorish, Ottoman or any ‘Islamic’ domina-
tion, such as the English, French, Russians and Dutch, who were the colonists and
imperialists in the African, Asian and Arab domains of the Muslim world. This can
hardly be called a reaction toMuslim aggression.
Moreover, the imagery of European Christians rising against and expelling the
dreaded Muslim occupier seems more a retroactive use of emotions and terminol-
ogy that belonged to the American Revolution or the Second World War than sub-
stantiated by historical facts. The European-Christian “victorious liberators” (Lewis’
terminology) in theOttomandomainshad to resort to carnage andconversion to cre-
ate a “Christian homeland” that they had only recently invented. And the Catholic
kings, when “liberating” Christian subjects from their Muslim rulers, did not take
them into the fold of Christendom but recognized them as a separate community,
first tolerated with their own religious courts and rites, just like the Muslims and
the Jews, and later persecuted by the Inquisition.
Iwould argue that thewars and insurgencies against the twomainMuslimpow-
ers in Europe – Ummayad (‘Moorish’) and Ottoman – were not Christian uprisings
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against centuries of bondage, but were part of a development on a much grander
scale that took place between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe: the
formation of nation-states where people with a single identity (cultural, ethnic, lin-
guistic, religious) livedwithin a single territory undermajority rule. Oppressive and
violent means were often deployed to achieve this goal, starting with the expulsion
and forced conversions ofMuslimsand Jews in Spain in the late fifteenth century (the
Jews of Western Europe had already experienced extradition in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries), then religious wars in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, followed by the fragmentation of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
Empires and, most recently, the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
An interactionof an entirely differentnature betweenEurope andphysical Islamwas
the coexistence of religious communities as a result of conquests by one of the par-
ties. It is not always clear to what extent the conqueror was welcomed; this seems
to have been the case when the Arabs conquered Spain and in some instances of the
early periods of Ottoman conquests in the Balkans; but suchwelcome seems to have
been absent during the Crusades in the Middle East and the Reconquista in Spain.
Nevertheless the reaction of subjugated peoples appears to have been more prag-
matic than principled: if the conqueror provided security, a reasonable tax burden
and a degree of religious and cultural freedom then he was acceptable to most peo-
ple.
In the situation of religiouslymixed societies religion played a prominent role in
the regulation of social order. Religious identity was such that it provided not only
a powerful self-identity, but also a social frame of reference. Social and political life
in religiously mixed communities might be determined by a variety of factors, and
piety among their peoples might differ from person to person, but the underlying
structure was controlled by the dichotomy of believer and unbeliever. Religion was
the most important identity marker that decided the demarcation lines between
the communities in terms of believers versus unbelievers and accordingly set the
rules of engagement between those communities. This order did not necessarily
have to reflect everyday reality in the interaction among people, but was imposed
fromabove: the ruling elite represented the believer and all other communitieswere
categorized under the single title of unbelievers.
Such was the case in the Christian as well as Islamic realms in Europe until well
into the nineteenth century. Religionwas themeasuring stick thatmaintained fixed
boundaries between believers and unbelievers (heretics as third category had to be
persecuted) that could at times perhaps be crossed socially and economically, but
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only within certain limits. Sexual relations, joining the military, being eligible for
slavery or becoming part of the ruling elitewere such limits, and crossing these lines
required that one converted. Tensions and revolts in realms with religiously mixed
societies in pre-modernEuropewere often for social or economic reasons, but almost
automatically acquired a religious dimension since that was the factor delineating
the structural differences in such society.
If there is any pattern to be seen in the interaction between Europe and physical Is-
lam, it is that they have interacted in a variety of ways like any other countries or
communities at any given time. Themain difference is that Europeans andMuslims
did not feel that theywere the same. Thiswas the domain of the interaction between
Europe and the Islam that we have called virtual Islam. Whereas we found few pat-
terns in the case of physical Islam, the interaction with virtual Islam – that is all
interaction involving ideas, images andknowledge about Islam–has beenquite con-
sistent through the centuries. This interaction can be summarized as conflict: in the
studies, polemics and images of Islam, Europeans have mostly – not always – main-
tained a position of antagonism towards Islam. Even the Protestants who claimed
preference for Turkish over Catholic rule still dismissed Islam as a heresy at best.
Islam representedmore than amere religion; it was presented as the opposite of Eu-
ropeanChristian identity, and this othernesswas discerned inmany aspects, some of
which have survived until now with remarkable tenacity: Islam is intolerant; Islam
is degrading towards women; Islam incites violence; Islam is anti-intellectual; Islam
prevents progress; Islam is against democracy and secularism – and to all of these we
must add: unlike us, Europeans of Christian stock. These conceptions and views of
Islam can easily be justified by historical facts. Butwemay equally easily find histor-
ical facts that will back up the opposite argument. The diversity of the interaction of
Europewithphysical Islamprovidesuswith sucha rich source ofhistorical realities –
intellectualism as well as ignorance, benevolent rule and despotism, religious toler-
ance and oppression of religion – that they can be used in any kind of argument. We
have seen in the Introduction to what different conclusions two eminent historians
likeBulliet andLewishave comeon thebasis of the samehistory of European-Islamic
relations.
The explanation for the negative image of Islam as the European Other must
therefore be sought not in physical Islam, but in virtual Islam. Physical Islam rep-
resents the inclusive Other who is different and strange and perhaps even repulsive,
but who at best is a source of fascination or admiration, and at worst is someone
one has to put up with in order to conduct business or keep diplomatic ties or
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maintain neighbourly relations. Virtual Islam, on the other hand, is a representa-
tion of the exclusive Other who is truly different in a negative way.4 Virtual Islam
allowed the European to develop ormaintain ideas about Islamwithout the need to
check with reality. Much, if not most, of the image of Islam and its adherents has
been developed, studied, cherished and passed on by the many Europeans who had
never met a Muslim in their lives. Insofar as they received first-hand information
fromOttoman lands and later also fromMuslim societies in European Empires, this
information was not provided to them by those who lived there, but by their com-
patriot Europeans who travelled or worked in those lands and returned with their
personal experiences. Even in societieswhereMuslims andChristians lived together,
as in the Balkans, the togetherness was mostly one of segregation: either they lived
removed from each other, or they knew little of each other.
Patterns into the Present
The European initiatives to create nation-states that were ethnically, linguistically,
culturally, and religiously homogeneous reached an apotheosis with the two great
wars in the first half of the twentieth century. After that, Europe took a radically dif-
ferent course by implementing a system that had already been under construction
for some time: a political and legal structure that allowed for diversity by guarantee-
ing fundamental rights and a rule of law. Religion as the main source of social and
legal structuringwas replaced by the notions of liberty and equality: each individual
was to pursue his own lifestyle, voice his own opinion and practise his own religion,
and in doing so all individuals were to be treated equally before the law regardless of
their religion, gender, colour or political affiliation.
In Western Europe the sudden and numerous presence of Muslims since the
1970s has challenged this new political-legal constellation, not because Muslims
were against it – on the contrary, it provided them with the freedom to maintain
their identity – but because it revealed that the underlying infrastructure of na-
tional, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religiousunitywas still inplace, either inprac-
tice or as anassumedquality of society. Itwas a self-imposedpredicament: Europeans
cherished thenewpolitical-legal values that granted freedoms to everyone, but these
same values demanded that Europeans allowed people to have and practise religious
and cultural values and customs that were alien to them. The antipathy that some
Western Europeans harboured against foreign migrants who came in large num-
bers from the 1970s onwards was therefore not only of a socio-economical nature –
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they were accused of stealing jobs and undermining European society by purport-
edly refusing to integrate – but also of a cultural nature: allowing different values
and customs that were allegedly not European was considered disruptive to Euro-
pean society. This applied in particular toMuslims, resulting in the particular form
of anxiety called Islamophobia.
Nevertheless, Muslims in Western Europe were gradually entering all echelons
of society. This is a dramatic change fromall previous centuries ofMuslim-Christian
coexistence where religion dictated one’s position in society. As mentioned, the new
political-legal constellation in Europe had replaced this social order with one based
on non-discrimination and personal liberty. These rights were arguably already in
place in earlier times (one needs to just think of the American and French bills
of rights of the late eighteenth century), but it took another century and a half
to put these rights into practice: Jews, coloured, women and gays all had to fight
prolonged battles to claim equal treatment. The EuropeanMuslims of todaymay be
suffering similar forms of discrimination, but they definitely benefitted from the
many minority struggles that preceded theirs. The rapid rise of some Muslims to
positions of prominence in European politics and government, and their gradual
formation into representative bodies and vocal lobby groups are mere examples of
their relatively advantageous position in this respect. In the particular case of the
Muslims, however, there are two factors that distinguish them from otherminority
communities: religion and historical ballast.
With regard to religionwehave seen thatmodernEurope is distinctively secular-
ized in twoways: religion is not important in the lives of the Europeanmajority, and
that same majority does not appreciate the manifestation of religion in the public
domain. This attitude has become incorporated into the European psyche andmany
Europeans therefore feel ill at easewhen confrontedwith actions and behaviour that
are of a distinct religious nature. We have seen that most modern scholars study
such actions and behaviour with a focus on issues like ethnicity, culture andmigra-
tion, with religionmerely being an additional factor thatmay compound social and
economic processes. Much of the political and public discourse, however, takes the
other extreme by explaining Muslim behaviour in terms of religion only. The sale
of Qurans in the Western world peaked after the attacks of 9/11, as did that of many
other books on Islam. This is a continuation of the centuries-old European tradi-
tion of studyingMuslims bymeans of Islamic scripture and texts.When I am invited
by teachers’ unions, police academies or medical schools to talk “about Islam”, they
never want to know about the prophet, the meaning of Ramadan or pilgrimage to
Mecca, or the tenets of Islam: they want to know if there is anything special about
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these people that makes them different – because that is what they experience in
their interactions with them at work – and assume that it is Islam.
Apparently religion has not disappeared from the social equation in Europe even
though it has dissipated as an official form of ordering society and modern Europe
has to a large extent secularized. Religion has stayed, but taken different forms.
While secularization gradually removed religion from the public domain, the great
European narrative of ‘Christian Europe’ is continued, albeit in a cultural man-
ner. This religious anchoring of European identity by default excluded Jews and
later also Muslims. Granted, it is fashionable to speak of ‘Judeo-Christian civiliza-
tion’, but the ‘Judeo’ part is only a politically correct supplement that came into
use after the horrors of the Holocaust. In addition to this cultural meaning, reli-
gion also plays a second, important role in modern Europe. In times when religion
is of much less importance to a majority of the European population,5 their under-
standing and consideration for those who are still religious have also become less.
From the perspective of religious people, regardless of their religion, such environ-
ment can be considered unfriendly or even hostile. This staunchly secular or even
anti-religious environment is not exclusively targeting devout Muslims, because it
targets all religious believers, but it has definitely contributed to theMuslims’ sense
of alienation, a feeling multiplied by the fact that they are mostly of foreign ori-
gin.
The second factor that distinguishes Muslims from other minorities is the his-
torical ballast of the old notion of the Muslim as the European Other. Here again
we see an uninterrupted continuation of Othering that has taken place in the previ-
ous centuries: Muslims are not European, because they are not secular, not woman-
friendly, intrinsically violent, primitive in their customs. An often-heard explana-
tion of this different attitude inserts a time element into this process of Othering:
the Muslim is placed in another, pre-modern time from that of the modern Euro-
pean, as if he is literally behind, so that the two live together but in parallel time
frames.6 Some add yet another element to the Muslim Other: he is not merely dif-
ferent, but a foreigner who does not belong here. We have seen this with regard to
the Moors and the Ottoman Turk, and nowadays again in the reaction to Muslim
radicals and terrorists. The European leftist radicals and terrorists of the 1970s were
feared, frowned upon and sometimes prosecuted, but never was it suggested that
they should be deported, as has been proposed with Muslim radicals and terrorists
who were born and raised in Europe. In the former case, the Other was ‘our’ prob-
lem; in the latter case the Other was a problem imposed on ‘us’ from the outside. A
large part of this sentiment has been attributed to the changing notion of borders;
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whereas they used to keep people out, they were crossed by immigrants and have
now beenmade permeable by globalism and transnationalism.7
That said, we must keep in mind that it does not hold for all Europeans; some
do not see a problem at all, and many Europeans work hard and conscientiously to
understand their Muslim patients, juvenile delinquents, students and neighbours
so that they canmore easily engage with them.
While the issues of religion and historical ballast may havemade the position of the
modern European Muslim different from that of other minorities, and while the
main obstacle to the devout Muslim may be the secular nature of modern Europe
(an obstacle the Muslim shares with devout Christians, Jews, Hindus and other
faithful), the most pressing problem in current times to my mind is the issue of
tolerance. I contend that tolerance has undergone a drastic transformation because
of the modern notion of equality.
In earlier times, racial, religious and gender differences were regulated by hier-
archical orders that gave everyone pre-fixed positions in the social order, whether
divinely or imperially ordained: “[i]mperial rule is historically the most successful
way of incorporating difference and facilitating (requiring is more accurate) peace-
ful existence.”8 Equality, on the other hand, demands an affirmative recognition of
others and of each other’s differences. Consequently, equality has drastically altered
the notion of toleration. Before, the ruling community or majority indulged itself
by allowing for certain differences in its subjects or theminority, respectively. From
its position of power, it determined what the limits of acceptable differences were
as practised by its subjects or minorities, and demanded full recognition of its own
ways. This situationno longerholds. Equality has turned thepowermechanism that
was essential to tolerance into a reciprocal process: we will recognize you (and your
differences) if you do the same to us.9
In the context of modern Europe, this change is a serious challenge to the per-
ceived self-evidence of the culture of themajority. According to theprinciples of their
own political-legal structure, native Europeans cannot claim amajority position de-
manding that their religious or cultural values are imposed on others. The notion
of tolerance has changed accordingly and has acquired a new meaning: as recogni-
tion. One is to recognize the differences of the other – within the framework of the
parameters set by the law, of course – but this has become subject to negotiation: the
European Muslim is asked to acknowledge loyalty to his society, while the Muslim
is prepared to do so only on the condition that he is recognized as Muslim, a notion
of religious identity that many secular Europeans find difficult to deal with.
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The transformation of the notion of tolerance lies at the heart of the European
struggle with immigrants and, more particularly, Muslims. The European demand
for cultural integration may contradict the immigrant’s or Muslim’s right to be
different, and to be treated as an equal in that respect. According to Talal Asad, this is
at the root of Europe’s identity crisis.He argues that Europeans arenot self-assuredly
declaring who they are, but anxiously demanding that Others recognize who they,
the Europeans, are: “(instead of) ‘This is my name,’ we now declare ‘I need you to
recognize me by that name’.”10
… To Be Extrapolated into the Future?
From this evaluation of the present let us now look into the future. How will the
interaction between Islam and Europe develop? Some observers speak hopefully of
the emergence of a “European Islam”; others are worried about the trend of ortho-
doxy among European Muslims and fear an ‘Islamization’ of Europe. Have Europe
and Islam indeed reached a juncture that will prove crucial to their future, so that
we are facing a choice between either “Islamization of Europe” or “Europanization
of Islam”, as some would have us believe?11
From a European perspective the notion of “Islamization of Europe” is not a
neutral observation indicating that Europe is experiencing more of the presence of
Muslims – and hence Islam – than it had before; it is a notion of concern, possibly of
fear. It is the anxiety about Europe losing its identity, irrevocably transforming into
something that it shouldnot.Wehave seen that it is hard to assess the exact numbers
of Muslims in Europe, and that it is almost impossible to gauge their religiousness,
but they are a tinyminority. Also, the fear that Islam by its nature drivesMuslims to
impose their values on their environment is not justified by the facts. Insofar as they
claim space in the secular Europeandomain to apply certain rules of Islam, it appears
to be exclusively for their own use. Of course there are zealous Muslims in Europe
calling for the spread of Islam and who welcome any convert to Islam, but they are
not unlike the many Christian missionary movements active in Europe. But even
if, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that Muslims have hidden agendas
of domination, it is quite striking that Europeans demonstrate so little faith in the
strength of their own values and structures to withstand the allegedly different
Islamic values of a very small minority.
Just as thenotion “Islamizationof Europe” is biasedbecause it reflects an anxiety,
so is its mirror-notion “Europeanization of Islam” based on preconceptions because
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it reflects – from the perspective of many Europeans – an optimistic anticipation.
It is the expectation that Muslims, under the influence of European liberalism and
enlightenment, will transform their Islam into a moderate religion. It is therefore
dumbfounding to many Europeans that the younger generation of Muslims in
Europe in particular is more religiously orthodox than the previous generation:
how can someone who is born and raised in a European secular, liberal society and
education system adhere to religion even more strongly than his or her parents?
The puzzlement about this alleged paradox is typical for Europeans; Americans, for
example, will have fewer problems understanding this situation because they are
much more accustomed to public intellectuals, scholars, scientists and politicians
who are also devout believers and publicly declare themselves to be so.
If there is any Europeanization of Islam, it is that Muslims are living in Europe,
and have adopted the European political-legal framework that provides them with
opportunities to practise their religion in ways they want to – opportunities that
they would not have in most Muslim-majority countries. At present many Mus-
lims in Europe use their freedom of religion to pursue an orthodox interpretation
of Islam, but this in itself does not justify the conclusion that such development is
anathema to European values or identity, nor that it will continue with the next
generations of European Muslims. What we are currently witnessing is Muslims
of migrant origin who are coming to terms with their particular European envi-
ronment as well as with an understanding of their identity, and consequently will
have to negotiate ways to adapt to a European religious-cultural and political-legal
environment and find ways to solve conflicts between that environment and their
Islamic tenets and identities. This dialectic of critical engagement byEuropeanMus-
lims is not new: it is a process that began in the period between the twoWorldWars12
and has regained its intensity from the 1990s onwards.13 An interesting role in this
respect is being played by BalkanMuslimswho have amuch longer and richer expe-
rience with Islam in Europe, and therefore deplore the fact that Western European
Muslims, as relative newcomers to the European scene, have so little, if any, interest
in their experiences.14
The two-choice question between Islamization of Europe and Europanization
of Islam, therefore, is a misguided way of looking at the phenomenon of ‘Islam in
Europe’. If there ever was a choice with regard to the future of Islam and its role in
Europe, it is a choice that Europe needs to make: will it adhere to its political-legal
values, such as liberalism, equality, human rights and democracy, and by conse-
quence allow for and recognize themany differences that new Europeanswill bring,
or will it block these differences by emphasizing a homogenuous set of – allegedly
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‘European’ – religious-cultural values? The burka bans in Belgium and France are a
typical sign of the latter: irrespective of whether one agrees or disagrees with those
bans, they were essentially a legalization of cultural values, of ‘this is how we do
things here’. Although enshrining cultural values in legal statutesmay reaffirm Eu-
ropean cultural identities, such an approach carries the distinct risk that it denies
other, fundamental values proclaimed by the European political-legal framework.
